HospitalInspections.org

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to ensure that corridors were separated from use areas by walls constructed with at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating in one waiting area in nuclear medicine. This could affect all individuals utilizing the services of the smoke compartment.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/2/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) and the Painter (staff P.) At approximately 3:30 PM two contiguous waiting areas in nuclear medicine were observed that were open to the corridor but did not have smoke detection. The areas were less than 600 square feet and did not obstruct access to exits. This finding was confirmed by staff Q during the tour.

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to maintain at least a two hour fire separation between the main hospital building and the Physicians Office Center. This could affect all individuals utilizing the services of the adjacent smoke compartments.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/2/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) and the Painter (staff P.) The fire separation barrier in the corridor between the main hospital building and the Physicians Office Center (POC) was observed at approximately 3:00 PM.

Unsealed or improperly sealed openings were observed in the POC side of the barrier as follows:

An opening around an orange pipe was filled with insulation.
There were openings around wires, a duct, and blue conduit.
Insulation was used to fill an opening around wires that were in a sleeve.

On the hospital side of the barrier, the same unsealed or improperly sealed openings were observed, and in addition there was an opening between three pipes.

These findings were confirmed by staff Q and staff P during the tour.

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to ensure that the electrical fixture in one of one medical gas storage areas was located at least five feet above the floor.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/3/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) from 9:30 AM until 11:00 AM. The medical gas storage area on the lower level contained approximately 2400 cubic feet of oxygen and nitrous in portable cylinders. The light switch in the room was located less than five feet above the floor. This finding was confirmed by staff Q during the tour.

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to ensure that corridors were separated from use areas by walls constructed with at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating in one waiting area in nuclear medicine. This could affect all individuals utilizing the services of the smoke compartment.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/2/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) and the Painter (staff P.) At approximately 3:30 PM two contiguous waiting areas in nuclear medicine were observed that were open to the corridor but did not have smoke detection. The areas were less than 600 square feet and did not obstruct access to exits. This finding was confirmed by staff Q during the tour.

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to maintain at least a two hour fire separation between the main hospital building and the Physicians Office Center. This could affect all individuals utilizing the services of the adjacent smoke compartments.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/2/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) and the Painter (staff P.) The fire separation barrier in the corridor between the main hospital building and the Physicians Office Center (POC) was observed at approximately 3:00 PM.

Unsealed or improperly sealed openings were observed in the POC side of the barrier as follows:

An opening around an orange pipe was filled with insulation.
There were openings around wires, a duct, and blue conduit.
Insulation was used to fill an opening around wires that were in a sleeve.

On the hospital side of the barrier, the same unsealed or improperly sealed openings were observed, and in addition there was an opening between three pipes.

These findings were confirmed by staff Q and staff P during the tour.

Based on observations made during tour and staff interview, it was determined that the facility failed to ensure that the electrical fixture in one of one medical gas storage areas was located at least five feet above the floor.

Findings include:

Tour was conducted on 2/3/10 with the Director of Plant Operations (staff Q) from 9:30 AM until 11:00 AM. The medical gas storage area on the lower level contained approximately 2400 cubic feet of oxygen and nitrous in portable cylinders. The light switch in the room was located less than five feet above the floor. This finding was confirmed by staff Q during the tour.