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Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that corridor doors were not prevented from closing. This was evidenced by the failure of corridors doors to fully close. This affected 2 of 6 smoke compartments in the 4th floor of the Main Building. This could result in failure to contain the spread of smoke and fire and the potential injury to patients and staff in the event of a fire.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with Plant Operation Engineer on February 15, 2011 at 1:45 p.m., the bedside table and intravenous pole blocked the door of Room 403 from fully closing.

2. During a tour of the facility with Plant Operation Engineer on February 16, 2011 at 1:25 p.m., intravenous poles and crutches blocked the door of the storage room, next to D-11, from closing.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 6, Plaza Surgery

2. At 1:30 p.m., the smoke barrier wall by the entrance to the Operating Room from the Pre-Operative Holding Area had a penetration located above the mechanical door closure that measured approximately 2-inches by 1/2-inch.

3. At 1:36 p.m., the smoke barrier wall by the entrance to the Operating Room from the Post Anesthesia Care Unit and next to the Coder/Biller Office had a penetration located above the mechanical door closure that measured approximately 1/2-inch. The same wall also had a penetration at the top left corner of an air duct that measured approximately 1/2-inch.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of smoke barrier walls and provide at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by a penetration in a smoke barrier wall in the Mental Health Center. This affected 2 of 2 smoke compartments and had the potential to allow the spread of smoke from one smoke compartment to another smoke compartment in the event of a fire.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the smoke barrier walls were observed. At 10:15 a.m., the smoke barrier wall by Room P18 had a 1-inch unsealed penetration.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of smoke barrier walls and provide at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by penetrations in smoke barrier walls in the Women's Health Center and Plaza Surgery. This could result in migration of smoke from one compartment to another and cause injury to patients from smoke inhalation and burns.

Findings:

2/17/2011, Bldg 2, Women's Center

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the smoke barrier walls were observed. At 11:05 a.m., the smoke barrier wall by the elevators and main lobby had fourteen penetrations. Twelve penetrations measured approximately 1/2-inch each and two penetrations measured approximately 1-inch each.

2/17/11, Bldg 5, Physical Rehabilitation

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer at 9:20 a.m., the fire barrier door, located by the horizontal corridor connection between the Physical Rehabilitation Building and the Main Hospital Building, had a 1/2-inch gap between the left and right leaf doors.

Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that the integrity of smoke barrier doors be maintained to prevent the passage of smoke. This was evidenced by a 1/2-inch gap between two door leafs. This affected 2 of 2 smoke compartments on the 4th Floor of the Main Hospital Building. This had the potential of rapidly spreading smoke and fire from one smoke compartment to the next, resulting in injury to residents from smoke inhalation and burns.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/15/2011, smoke barrier doors were observed. At 1:43 p.m., smoke barrier doors by the Resource Center Office on the East section of the 4th Floor had a 1/2-inch opening between the left and right leaf doors.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain its fire rated construction protecting hazardous areas. This was evidenced by a penetration in the closet wall of an electrical panel room and oxygen cylinder storage room. This finding could result in the spread of smoke and fire and increase the risk of injury to resident and staff in the event of a fire.

Findings:
2/17/2011, Outpatient Rehab Clinic

1. During the facility tour with Plant Operation Engineer on February 17, 2011 at 2:38 p.m., there was a 14 inch by 1 inch penetration in the eletrical panel closet in the Outpatient Rehabilitation Clinic on Wakatusa Street.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 6, Plaza Surgey

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the oxygen storage room was observed. At 1:51 p.m., there were two penetrations that measured approximately 1-inch each in diameter in the oxygen storage room wall. The first penetration was located on the lower left corner of the medical gas pipping. The second penetration was located behind the oxygen compressed gas manifold box.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of fire barrier walls in horizontal corridor connections and provide at least a two hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by penetrations on fire barrier walls on the 2nd-Level Floor and the A-Level Floor of the Main Hospital Building. This affected 4 of 4 fire barrier compartments and had the potential to allow the spread of smoke and fire from one compartment to another compartment, resulting in injury to residents and staff.

Findings:

During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer, the fire barrier walls were observed.

1. On 02/15/2011, at 2:57 p.m., the fire barrier wall, located on the 2nd Floor by the horizontal corridor connection in 2 North, had a mesh wire covering a penetration measuring approximately 2-inches. The mesh wire contained multiple unsealed penetrations.

2. On 02/16/2011, at 2:19 p.m., the fire barrier wall, located on the A Floor by the horizontal corridor connection and next to the MRI Room, had multiple penetrations surrounding piping. Two medical gas piping (oxygen and nitrogen), punctured through walls and had unsealed penetrations surrounding piping that measured approximately 1-inch each. The water line piping had unsealed penetrations surrounding piping that measured approximately 1/2-inch.

Based on observation and interview, the facility failed to ensure that exits were not obstructed. This was evidenced by a soiled linen container stored in the corridor by the back exit. This could result in the delay in the evacuation of the facility by the patients and the increased risk of injury to the clients due to fire.

Findings:

During the facility tour with Plant Operation Engineer on February 17, 2011 at 2:36 p.m., in the Rehabilitation Center on Wakatusu Street, in the corridor by the back exit door, there were two oversize full dirty linen carts. Interview with Lead Therapist at 2:37 p.m., he acknowledged that the oversize dirty linen carts are stored daily in that location.

Based on observation , the facility failed to maintain the automatic sprinkler system and failed to maintain an 18 inch clearance around the sprinkler heads. This was evidenced by sprinkler head blocked by supply materials, debris on sprinkler heads and missing escutcheon ring. This could result in compromized water dispersion from an activated sprinkler head and make the sprinkler system ineffective in extinguishing fire.


Findings:

The sprinkler system and its components were observed with the Plant Operation Engineer.

1. On February 15, 2011 at 1:40 p.m., in the Palliative Care Office , on fourth floor of the Main Building, there were binders on the top shelf of a file and a desk organizer stacked within 18 inch space of sprinkler head

2. On February 17, 2011 at 11:16 a.m., the Lactation room of the Women's Center , first level across from Room 43 , top shelf had supply stacked within the 18 inches of sprinkler head.

3. On February 15, 2011 at 1:20 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Dictation Room on the 5th floor of the Main Building had an accumulation of debris/dust.

4. At 1:22 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Manager Office on the 5th floor of the Main Building had an accumulation of debris/dust.

5. At 2:14 p.m., Room 319, the sprinkler head on third floor of the Main Building had an accumulation debris/dust.

6. At 2:15 p.m., Room 331, the sprinkler head on third floor of Main Building had an accumulation of debris /dust.

7. At 3 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Staff Restroom on the 2nd floor passage way had accumulation of debris/dust.

8. On February 16, 2011 at 3:10 p.m., the Staff Lounge, on the first floor, Main Building by cath laboratory, the sprinkler head was missing the escutcheon ring.

Based on document review and interview, the facility failed to ensure that 45 of 527 smoke/fire dampers were inspected and tested in accordance with NFPA 90A. This could result in spread of fire and smoke through smoke compartments during fire.

NFPA 90A, 5.4.7 requires at least every 4 years the following maintenance be performed:
(1) Fusible links (where applicable) shall be removed.
(2) All dampers shall be operated to verify that they close fully.
(3) The latch, if provided, shall be checked.
(4) Moving parts shall be lubricated as necessary.

Findings:

During document review with the Director of Facility Engineering on February 15, 2011, the facility's fire/smoke damper maintenance records were reviewed.

At 10:30 a.m., the records indicated that there were 45 dampers that were not inspected and tested because there was no access to them. When interviewed on February 15, 2011, at 10:40 a.m., the Director of Facilities Engineering stated that the dampers located in 1 hour rated fire walls were not required to be inspected if the building was fully sprinklered. The fire/smoke dampers that were not tested were in the 1 hour wall.

Based on observation and interview, the facility failed to maintain an unobstructed path of egress. This was evidenced by computer on wheels left in the corridor for charging. This could delay evacuation during fire or other emergencies.

Findings:

On 2/15 to 17/2011, the path of egress was observed with the Engineering staff.

2/15/11, Bldg 1, Main Building

1. At 2:09 p.m., in the third floor of the main building, there were computer on wheels in the corridor plugged in to surge protectors. There were 3 computer on wheels left between rooms 314 and 317 for charging. The Unit manager stated they were charged in that location most of the time. The charging time was approximately 4 hours. There were computer on wheels being charged in the corridor by 327, 323, and 335.

Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that oxygen cylinders were secured to prevent tipping over. This was evidenced by oxygen tanks stored unsecured in rooms. These could result in the increased risk of a fire within the facility and the increased risk of injury to the residents and staff due to the fire.

Findings:

On 2/16/2011, during an tour of facility with the Plant Operation Engineer, oxygen cylinders were observed.
1. At 9:44 a.m., in Room 4235, soiled utility room, fourth floor of expansion wing, an "E" size- oxygen tank was found laying on the floor unsecured.
2. At 9:55 a.m., in Room 4008, storage room, fourth floor of expansion wing , an "E" size -oxygen tank was found standing unsecured in the room

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain equipment, in accordance with NFPA 101 and manufacturer's specifications, as evidenced by two clothes dryer machines with heavy accumulation of lint in the Basement of the Main Hospital Building. This had the potential of igniting and causing fire to building.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2000 Edition
4.6.12 Maintenance and Testing.
4.6.12.1 Whenever or wherever any device, equipment, system, condition, arrangement, level of protection, or any other feature is required for compliance with the provisions of this Code, such device, equipment, system, condition, arrangement, level of protection, or any other feature shall thereafter be continuously maintained in accordance with applicable NFPA requirements or as directed by the authority having jurisdiction.

Findings:

During the facility tour with the facility's consultant on 2/16/11, the laundry room in the basement was observed. At 11:34 a.m., the lint traps to 2 of 2 clothes dryers were opened and observed to contain heavy accumulation of lint. The first clothes dryer contained approximately 1/2-inch to 1-inch thickness of lint accumulated on the dryer floor. The second clothes dryer contained approximately 1/2-inch to 2-inch thickness of lint accumulated on the dryer floor. No records of cleaning intervals were in place.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain electrical safety in accordance with NFPA 70. This was evidenced by a broken face plate to a receptacle outlet in a patient's room on the 5th Floor of Main Hospital Building and an electrical panel with exposed electrical wire. This had the potential of electrocuting personnel and cause electrical fire.

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, 1999 Edition
110-56. Energized Parts. Bare terminals of transformers, switches, motor controllers, and other equipment shall be enclosed to prevent accidental contact with energized parts.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/15/2011, electrical components were observed. At 1:20 p.m., the electrical outlet, located by the resident's room window in Room 516, had a broken face plate.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 4, Mental Health

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, electrical panels were observed. At 9:52 a.m., the electrical panel labeled 3MA, Mental Health Building located inside a room with door labeled 15, had two open breakers. The openings, labeled 2 & 6, exposed energized parts.

Based on observation, the facility failed to install the Alcohol Based Hand Rub (ABHR) dispensers away from ignition sources. This was evidenced by an ABHR dispenser mounted on a wall over or adjacent an ignition source. This could result in an electrical fire and increase the risk of injury to residents, visitors and staff in the event of a fire.



Findings:

The alcohol based hand rub dispensers (ABHR) were observed with the engineering staff.

2/16/2011 , Bldg. 1, Main Hospital

1. At 1:25 p.m., the ABHR dispenser was mounted directly above a light switch in Imaging on A Level.

2/17/2011, Bldg 5, Physical Therapy

2. At 9:25 a.m., an ABHR dispenser containing 62% alcohol was installed above and within 4 inches adjacent to a light switch in the Pulmonary Rehabilitation Office.

3. At 9:27 a.m., an ABHR dispenser containing 62% alcohol was installed above and within 4 inches adjacent to a light switch in the Storage Equipment Room.

Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that corridor doors were not prevented from closing. This was evidenced by the failure of corridors doors to fully close. This affected 2 of 6 smoke compartments in the 4th floor of the Main Building. This could result in failure to contain the spread of smoke and fire and the potential injury to patients and staff in the event of a fire.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with Plant Operation Engineer on February 15, 2011 at 1:45 p.m., the bedside table and intravenous pole blocked the door of Room 403 from fully closing.

2. During a tour of the facility with Plant Operation Engineer on February 16, 2011 at 1:25 p.m., intravenous poles and crutches blocked the door of the storage room, next to D-11, from closing.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 6, Plaza Surgery

2. At 1:30 p.m., the smoke barrier wall by the entrance to the Operating Room from the Pre-Operative Holding Area had a penetration located above the mechanical door closure that measured approximately 2-inches by 1/2-inch.

3. At 1:36 p.m., the smoke barrier wall by the entrance to the Operating Room from the Post Anesthesia Care Unit and next to the Coder/Biller Office had a penetration located above the mechanical door closure that measured approximately 1/2-inch. The same wall also had a penetration at the top left corner of an air duct that measured approximately 1/2-inch.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of smoke barrier walls and provide at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by a penetration in a smoke barrier wall in the Mental Health Center. This affected 2 of 2 smoke compartments and had the potential to allow the spread of smoke from one smoke compartment to another smoke compartment in the event of a fire.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the smoke barrier walls were observed. At 10:15 a.m., the smoke barrier wall by Room P18 had a 1-inch unsealed penetration.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of smoke barrier walls and provide at least a one-half hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by penetrations in smoke barrier walls in the Women's Health Center and Plaza Surgery. This could result in migration of smoke from one compartment to another and cause injury to patients from smoke inhalation and burns.

Findings:

2/17/2011, Bldg 2, Women's Center

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the smoke barrier walls were observed. At 11:05 a.m., the smoke barrier wall by the elevators and main lobby had fourteen penetrations. Twelve penetrations measured approximately 1/2-inch each and two penetrations measured approximately 1-inch each.

2/17/11, Bldg 5, Physical Rehabilitation

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer at 9:20 a.m., the fire barrier door, located by the horizontal corridor connection between the Physical Rehabilitation Building and the Main Hospital Building, had a 1/2-inch gap between the left and right leaf doors.

Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that the integrity of smoke barrier doors be maintained to prevent the passage of smoke. This was evidenced by a 1/2-inch gap between two door leafs. This affected 2 of 2 smoke compartments on the 4th Floor of the Main Hospital Building. This had the potential of rapidly spreading smoke and fire from one smoke compartment to the next, resulting in injury to residents from smoke inhalation and burns.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/15/2011, smoke barrier doors were observed. At 1:43 p.m., smoke barrier doors by the Resource Center Office on the East section of the 4th Floor had a 1/2-inch opening between the left and right leaf doors.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain its fire rated construction protecting hazardous areas. This was evidenced by a penetration in the closet wall of an electrical panel room and oxygen cylinder storage room. This finding could result in the spread of smoke and fire and increase the risk of injury to resident and staff in the event of a fire.

Findings:
2/17/2011, Outpatient Rehab Clinic

1. During the facility tour with Plant Operation Engineer on February 17, 2011 at 2:38 p.m., there was a 14 inch by 1 inch penetration in the eletrical panel closet in the Outpatient Rehabilitation Clinic on Wakatusa Street.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 6, Plaza Surgey

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, the oxygen storage room was observed. At 1:51 p.m., there were two penetrations that measured approximately 1-inch each in diameter in the oxygen storage room wall. The first penetration was located on the lower left corner of the medical gas pipping. The second penetration was located behind the oxygen compressed gas manifold box.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain the integrity of fire barrier walls in horizontal corridor connections and provide at least a two hour fire resistance rating. This was evidenced by penetrations on fire barrier walls on the 2nd-Level Floor and the A-Level Floor of the Main Hospital Building. This affected 4 of 4 fire barrier compartments and had the potential to allow the spread of smoke and fire from one compartment to another compartment, resulting in injury to residents and staff.

Findings:

During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer, the fire barrier walls were observed.

1. On 02/15/2011, at 2:57 p.m., the fire barrier wall, located on the 2nd Floor by the horizontal corridor connection in 2 North, had a mesh wire covering a penetration measuring approximately 2-inches. The mesh wire contained multiple unsealed penetrations.

2. On 02/16/2011, at 2:19 p.m., the fire barrier wall, located on the A Floor by the horizontal corridor connection and next to the MRI Room, had multiple penetrations surrounding piping. Two medical gas piping (oxygen and nitrogen), punctured through walls and had unsealed penetrations surrounding piping that measured approximately 1-inch each. The water line piping had unsealed penetrations surrounding piping that measured approximately 1/2-inch.

Based on observation and interview, the facility failed to ensure that exits were not obstructed. This was evidenced by a soiled linen container stored in the corridor by the back exit. This could result in the delay in the evacuation of the facility by the patients and the increased risk of injury to the clients due to fire.

Findings:

During the facility tour with Plant Operation Engineer on February 17, 2011 at 2:36 p.m., in the Rehabilitation Center on Wakatusu Street, in the corridor by the back exit door, there were two oversize full dirty linen carts. Interview with Lead Therapist at 2:37 p.m., he acknowledged that the oversize dirty linen carts are stored daily in that location.

Based on observation , the facility failed to maintain the automatic sprinkler system and failed to maintain an 18 inch clearance around the sprinkler heads. This was evidenced by sprinkler head blocked by supply materials, debris on sprinkler heads and missing escutcheon ring. This could result in compromized water dispersion from an activated sprinkler head and make the sprinkler system ineffective in extinguishing fire.


Findings:

The sprinkler system and its components were observed with the Plant Operation Engineer.

1. On February 15, 2011 at 1:40 p.m., in the Palliative Care Office , on fourth floor of the Main Building, there were binders on the top shelf of a file and a desk organizer stacked within 18 inch space of sprinkler head

2. On February 17, 2011 at 11:16 a.m., the Lactation room of the Women's Center , first level across from Room 43 , top shelf had supply stacked within the 18 inches of sprinkler head.

3. On February 15, 2011 at 1:20 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Dictation Room on the 5th floor of the Main Building had an accumulation of debris/dust.

4. At 1:22 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Manager Office on the 5th floor of the Main Building had an accumulation of debris/dust.

5. At 2:14 p.m., Room 319, the sprinkler head on third floor of the Main Building had an accumulation debris/dust.

6. At 2:15 p.m., Room 331, the sprinkler head on third floor of Main Building had an accumulation of debris /dust.

7. At 3 p.m., the sprinkler head in the Staff Restroom on the 2nd floor passage way had accumulation of debris/dust.

8. On February 16, 2011 at 3:10 p.m., the Staff Lounge, on the first floor, Main Building by cath laboratory, the sprinkler head was missing the escutcheon ring.

Based on document review and interview, the facility failed to ensure that 45 of 527 smoke/fire dampers were inspected and tested in accordance with NFPA 90A. This could result in spread of fire and smoke through smoke compartments during fire.

NFPA 90A, 5.4.7 requires at least every 4 years the following maintenance be performed:
(1) Fusible links (where applicable) shall be removed.
(2) All dampers shall be operated to verify that they close fully.
(3) The latch, if provided, shall be checked.
(4) Moving parts shall be lubricated as necessary.

Findings:

During document review with the Director of Facility Engineering on February 15, 2011, the facility's fire/smoke damper maintenance records were reviewed.

At 10:30 a.m., the records indicated that there were 45 dampers that were not inspected and tested because there was no access to them. When interviewed on February 15, 2011, at 10:40 a.m., the Director of Facilities Engineering stated that the dampers located in 1 hour rated fire walls were not required to be inspected if the building was fully sprinklered. The fire/smoke dampers that were not tested were in the 1 hour wall.

Based on observation and interview, the facility failed to maintain an unobstructed path of egress. This was evidenced by computer on wheels left in the corridor for charging. This could delay evacuation during fire or other emergencies.

Findings:

On 2/15 to 17/2011, the path of egress was observed with the Engineering staff.

2/15/11, Bldg 1, Main Building

1. At 2:09 p.m., in the third floor of the main building, there were computer on wheels in the corridor plugged in to surge protectors. There were 3 computer on wheels left between rooms 314 and 317 for charging. The Unit manager stated they were charged in that location most of the time. The charging time was approximately 4 hours. There were computer on wheels being charged in the corridor by 327, 323, and 335.

Based on observation, the facility failed to ensure that oxygen cylinders were secured to prevent tipping over. This was evidenced by oxygen tanks stored unsecured in rooms. These could result in the increased risk of a fire within the facility and the increased risk of injury to the residents and staff due to the fire.

Findings:

On 2/16/2011, during an tour of facility with the Plant Operation Engineer, oxygen cylinders were observed.
1. At 9:44 a.m., in Room 4235, soiled utility room, fourth floor of expansion wing, an "E" size- oxygen tank was found laying on the floor unsecured.
2. At 9:55 a.m., in Room 4008, storage room, fourth floor of expansion wing , an "E" size -oxygen tank was found standing unsecured in the room

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain equipment, in accordance with NFPA 101 and manufacturer's specifications, as evidenced by two clothes dryer machines with heavy accumulation of lint in the Basement of the Main Hospital Building. This had the potential of igniting and causing fire to building.

NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2000 Edition
4.6.12 Maintenance and Testing.
4.6.12.1 Whenever or wherever any device, equipment, system, condition, arrangement, level of protection, or any other feature is required for compliance with the provisions of this Code, such device, equipment, system, condition, arrangement, level of protection, or any other feature shall thereafter be continuously maintained in accordance with applicable NFPA requirements or as directed by the authority having jurisdiction.

Findings:

During the facility tour with the facility's consultant on 2/16/11, the laundry room in the basement was observed. At 11:34 a.m., the lint traps to 2 of 2 clothes dryers were opened and observed to contain heavy accumulation of lint. The first clothes dryer contained approximately 1/2-inch to 1-inch thickness of lint accumulated on the dryer floor. The second clothes dryer contained approximately 1/2-inch to 2-inch thickness of lint accumulated on the dryer floor. No records of cleaning intervals were in place.

Based on observation, the facility failed to maintain electrical safety in accordance with NFPA 70. This was evidenced by a broken face plate to a receptacle outlet in a patient's room on the 5th Floor of Main Hospital Building and an electrical panel with exposed electrical wire. This had the potential of electrocuting personnel and cause electrical fire.

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, 1999 Edition
110-56. Energized Parts. Bare terminals of transformers, switches, motor controllers, and other equipment shall be enclosed to prevent accidental contact with energized parts.

Findings:

1. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/15/2011, electrical components were observed. At 1:20 p.m., the electrical outlet, located by the resident's room window in Room 516, had a broken face plate.

2/17/2011, Bldg. 4, Mental Health

2. During a tour of the facility with the Maintenance Engineer on 02/17/2011, electrical panels were observed. At 9:52 a.m., the electrical panel labeled 3MA, Mental Health Building located inside a room with door labeled 15, had two open breakers. The openings, labeled 2 & 6, exposed energized parts.